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Wittgenstein’s Attitudes 
Fabien Schang, Nancy, France 
1. Between language and mind: a logic of 
propositional attitudes ... 
The statement in §5.542 concerns the logical form of pecu-
liar propositional attitudes, viz. belief-statements: 
But it is clear that "A believes that p", "A thinks p",
"A says p", are of the form " 'p' says p": and here we 
have no co-ordination of a fact and an object, but a 
co-ordination of facts by means of a co- ordination 
of their objects.
This formulation sounds queer, and we will attempt to see 
why Wittgenstein did state it so before considering Hin-
tikka's replies in favor of epistemic modal logic. 
The core problem concerns truth-functions theory: is 
any meaning-function a truth-function? (Russell 1923) 
made a distinction between two sorts of occurrence for a 
proposition, namely: meaning-functions that contain 
propositions as a member are also truth-functions 
whenever the component proposition occurs as expressing 
a fact (i.e. an ontological entity); they are not so whenever 
the proposition occurs as a fact in its own right, given that 
the whole sentence then talks about the component 
proposition itself. It is precisely the case with propositional 
attitudes, where the fact in consideration is the form of 
words uttered by the speaker. It thus seems that not every 
meaning-function is truth-functional and, in this respect, 
Russell's position is to be compared with what Frege 
argued about the change of denotation in a context of 
indirect discourse.
Nevertheless, (Wittgenstein 1922) does not accept 
any other meaning-functions than the truth-functional 
ones: not only “Propositions are truth-functions of 
elementary propositions” (§5), but also “There is one and 
only one complete analysis of the proposition” (§3.25). If 
so, the preceding logical analyses as suggested by 
Russell and Frege cannot be accepted because they go 
beyond truth-function theory, the only one for Wittgenstein 
(“In the general propositional form, propositions occur in a 
proposition only as bases of the truth-operations”, §5.54). 
Therefore, the point is not to delimit one context of 
application for truth-functional propositions while ruling out 
some propositions of an intensional sort; rather, the point 
is to streamline every meaningful proposition within the 
unique pattern of truth-functions. There cannot be any 
exception to the theory of extensionality, from a Tractarian 
perspective.
For one thing, the analysis of "A believes p" 
excludes the subject A from its logical form while replacing 
it by a mention of the proposition within single brackets, 'p'. 
The result seems to be counterintuitive, reducing belief to 
an impersonal relation between a linguistic expression (i.e. 
the propositional sign) and that what it designates (i.e. the 
propositional fact that constitutes a thought). Why such an 
exclusion of the thinking subject, and how to analyze a 
belief while eliminating the psychological side of an 
attitude? (Russell 1923) did not reject it from his own 
analysis, given that he conceived the believer as a 
sequence of psychological facts expressed by means of 
sentences. But those beliefs were then associated with a 
single subject; now Wittgenstein's account definitely 
cancels this particular subject and talks instead about 
some arbitrary sentence in the form 'p'.  
In order to understand such a mysterious statement 
as §5.542, several writers accounted for it in two steps, 
namely: Wittgenstein's theory of object and his subsequent 
distinction between an empirical and a metaphysical 
subject.
2. … is not a problem of mind
(no psychologism!) ... 
In (Russell 1923)'s account, each proposition was treated 
as a class of psychological facts that introduce A's mind 
through the analysis of propositional attitudes. The logical 
form of "A believes that p" thus corresponds to the correla-
tion of a fact, i.e. the propositional fact that p, and an ob-
ject, i.e. A's mind. However, any object is simple, Wittgen-
stein claims (“The object is simple”, §2.02), whereas A's 
mind is complex (as a sequence of psychological facts), so 
that the logical form assigned to propositional attitudes is 
not correct. The logical form required for any states of 
affairs (“An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, 
things)”, §2.01) thus leads Wittgenstein to discard proposi-
tional attitudes as states of affairs, in their current reading 
as a co-ordination of a fact and an object. Such a position 
leads him to the equally queer statement: “This shows that 
there is no such thing as the soul – the subject, etc. – as it 
is conceived in superficial psychology. A composite soul 
would not be a soul any longer” (§5.5421).  
Isn't the price to pay for accepting Wittgenstein's 
logical analysis too expensive, if the rejection of 
propositional attitudes apparently leads one to a rejection 
of psychology? (Favrholdt 1964, 559) notes that this result 
directly follows from the Tractarian theory of objects: 
For the superficial psychologists that maintain this it 
would be reasonable to say that "A says p" is a co-
ordination of a fact in the Wittgensteinian sense, 
namely a propositional sign, and an object, namely 
the thinking, presenting soul, which being simple is 
to be called an object. This view Wittgenstein is 
bound to reject. According to the picture theory in 
the Tractatus no co-ordination could ever be estab-
lished between a fact and an object. The two enti-
ties in question have to be equally articulated in or-
der to be co-ordinated. Objects can be co-ordinated 
with objects (because they are simple) and facts 
can be co-ordinated with facts in so far as they can 
be analysed into the same amounts of elements. 
(559)
This prevents Wittgenstein from viewing propositional atti-
tudes in the usual way, to be found in epistemic modal 
logic. Hence his second argument that accounts for 
§5.542: the distinction between an empirical and a meta-
physical subject.
(Hintikka 1958) puts such a distinction to avoid 
some misunderstanding in Wittgenstein's language theory, 
namely: his thesis of solipsism, ordinarily considered as an 
argument for private language. In order to clarify the 
following passage: “That the world is my world, shows 
itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the
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language which I understand) mean the limits of my world” 
(§5.62), (Hintikka 1958) argues that Wittgenstein's concern 
is not the empirical subject but the "metaphysical" 
subject discussed in philosophy. In other words, he 
is interested only in what can be said to be mine 
necessarily; for otherwise he would only be doing 
empirical psychology. But the only necessity there 
is, according to the other doctrines of the Tractatus,
is the empty tautological necessity of logic. (89) 
As a matter of fact, solipsism suggests the private charac-
ter of our current thoughts: “The limits of my language
mean the limits of my world” (§5.6). Now Wittgenstein 
doesn't support the view of a private language altogether. 
As a way to disentangle this wrong connection, Hintikka 
argues that the Tractarian "I" is not a psychological ego or 
single thinker. It is not the agent of Hintikka's later epis-
temic logic, but an abstract subject embodying the whole 
set of propositions: “The subject does not belong to the 
world but it is a limit of the world” (§5.632). Wittgenstein's 
picture theory of language should recall us that the limits of 
the world are determined as the limits of language, where 
the projective relation between both stands for the corre-
spondence between a pictured fact and a picturing propo-
sition.
Moreover, the metaphysical subject cannot talk 
about itself within the very language it embodies, contrary 
to the case of propositional attitudes: “No proposition can 
say anything about itself, because the propositional sign 
cannot be contained in itself (that is the "whole theory of 
types")” (§3.332). In virtue of such an impossible self-
reference for the Wittgensteinian subject, believing that p 
is the case is thus confined to the impersonal relation 
between a propositional sign and a proposition: 'p' says p, 
meaning that the propositional sign expresses p's being 
the case. Consequently, solipsism means the obvious 
impossibility for the metaphysical subject to go beyond the 
limits of language, given that the latter is a precondition to 
the former; but solipsism does not mean the impossibility 
for a psychological subject to express her own thoughts. 
On the contrary, Wittgenstein's thoughts are as public as 
Frege's ones (the Gedanken) and his solipsism does not 
mean at all that thoughts are private representations 
(Vorstellungen). Nevertheless, such public thoughts are 
separated from the psychological subject that grasps them 
in the Tractatus, hence the resulting logical form in §5.542. 
Now (Favrholdt 1964) recalls in the same time that 
the thinker implicitly occurs in the relation expressed in 
§5.542 between 'p' and p:  
"'p' says p" says nothing more than p. It states that 
the propositional sign is being thought, and this is 
the same as asserting the proposition p. Therefore, 
according to Wittgenstein, in sentences as ‘A says 
p’, p is not occurring in a proposition in a special 
way which is in conflict with his general theory of 
truth-functions. (560). 
3. ... but a problem of language  
(no metatheory!) 
It will be attempted to show in the following that epistemic 
logic amounts to some compromise between both topics: it 
introduces belief into logic while presenting it as the public 
occurrence of a statement, or assertion. But the Tractarian 
view of logic excluded to do so. 
Assuming that assertion refers to the occurrence of 
a belief by means of a statement, it does not add anything 
to propositions that serve to make it explicit and is to be 
located in the domain of psychological events. The very 
project of a "doxastic logic" is therefore absurd, in the light 
of the Tractarian language theory: 
The thought makes a une proposition out of the 
propositional sign p and this is the same as assert-
ing p. If p is not thought it remains a propositinal 
sign and the expression "Ōp" in this case is absurd; 
you cannot at the same time assert, that is to say 
think p, and not think p. Hence the assertion sign is 
logically altogether meaningless (see 4.442). (560) 
As to the rules of logic, they specify the limits within which 
subjects do and can express themselves: inferences and 
tautologies don't say anything but embed propositional 
forms that subjects cannot think of, because either these 
forms don't depict any particular image (excluded middle) 
or cancel any of them (non-contradiction). The projective 
nature of language according to Wittgenstein makes his 
logical theory appear as a sort of transcendental frame for 
thinking. Such a view could be interpreted as reminiscent 
of Kant's transcendental logic, to be defined as an inquiry 
into the conditions of a priori possibility for experience 
according to the categories of understanding. Apart from 
the notion of understanding, Kant's criticism is found again 
here in the impossibility for any empirical subject to know 
the limits of language; empirical subjects think within lan-
guage, and they cannot depart from it in order to contem-
plate outwardly what makes a distinction between logical 
and illogical thoughts. 
Logic is thus characterized as a method of 
projecting true or false propositions of a language into 
states of affairs (Tatsachen) or mere situations 
(Sachverhalte), respectively; but these methods are 
inexpressible by themselves. Formal semantics cannot be 
described in the latter: the rules for applying a set of 
formulas into some given model, as depicted in every 
metalanguage from a model-theoretical semantics, 
couldn't be conceived in a Tractarian line. If any subject A 
believes in a contradiction, for example, (Favrholdt 1964) 
recalls that the distinction between a propositional sign 
and a thought makes such a belief meaningless (its 
projection is impossible, as pointing out no plausible 
direction):
Wouldn't it be possible for A to say "p . ~p" thus vio-
lating the laws of logic? The answer is no (...) A can 
think "p" or he can think "ap". In the first case the 
first link of p . ~p will become a proposition but the 
last part (~p) will remain a propositional sign, be-
cause it is not thought (…) Therefore if one cannot 
think anything unlogical he cannot present anything 
in language which "contradicts logic" either. For lan-
guage is not the physical facts that we call proposi-
tional signs, but these facts in their projective rela-
tion to other facts. (561-2) 
Epistemic modal logic is in total agreement with this, when 
forbidding any two contradictory propositions to be em-
bedded into one and the same "model". The metaproperty 
of consistency says no more than Wittgenstein did here; it 
does the same thing but in saying it with terms, that is, 
within a construed formal semantics.  
4. Conclusion: metatheory as a  
precondition for modal logics 
Universality of language and ineffability of semantics are 
two preconditions that Hintikka will rule out from his very 
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view of logic, in accordance with his distinction between 
logic as a universal language and logic as a calculus; the 
same does for other modal logics than epistemic logic, 
given that any judgment about a proposition was made 
impossible by Wittgenstein. Such a Tractarian impossibility 
came from ineffability as a unknowable relation between 
language and reality. It also follows from this a crucial 
nexus between symbolism and formalism: language sym-
bolizes the world, nothing else, and any formalized lan-
guage should yield a genuine picture of reality. 
The point with epistemic logic is that it becomes 
acceptable only when the preceding preconditions have 
been qualified. Such a qualification is allowed only within a 
model-theoretical framework that Wittgenstein refused for 
philosophical reasons, so that Suszko's initial objection 
pointed to the right direction while assuming uncharitably 
something justifiably refused by the Tractatus.
In a nutshell: only God can rule in logic, for 
Wittgenstein; but Suszko was an atheist and God is 
(officially) dead with Tarski, so to say. 
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